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warbosstodd

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Awkwardparticle

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Advice on washing clothes by hand?

These sorts of buckets are often free because they’re the waste packaging used for commercial quantities of things like laundry detergent or cake frosting. I typically get a few of these for free from my local grocery store or dry cleaners every year to plant vegetables in. Could someone with a drill do that part for you? Could your landlady do that part, as she is presumably also without a washing machine now?

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Vupperware

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Francis_Fujiwara

just a common Lemmy user. I quit Reddit and I don’t regret it, btw I use Arch.

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Fedora Now? Really?

Just another distro-hopper thinking they’re getting a solution by hopping. If I had to do Linux again, it would be Arch. -It never took more than 10 minutes to fix, while Fedora wasn’t fixable. Fedora’s breakages were drastic work-flow changing. It forced Wayland while disallowing Hyprland. Forced Pipewire breaking ac3 pass-through before Pipewire was ready, and I learned to live with Pulse. It repeatedly made dependencies for apps I used daily; break. Fedora is a Guinea pig distro and he’s a fool.

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💭 ❗Top Imaginary Network posts of the month❗ 💭 (01 Jul 2026)

1. 🖼️ Broomboarder by Alex Blain (direct link) (👍260 👎0) from Imaginary Witches ([email protected]) Posted by hitstun 2. 🖼️ John Blanche art mega thread (direct link) (👍56 👎1) from Imaginary Warhammer ([email protected]) Posted by setsneedtofeed 3. 🖼️ 急な木漏れ日にご注意。 by 白玉派 (direct link) (👍7 👎0) from Imaginary Slice of Life ([email protected]) Posted by CsXGF8uzUAOh6fqV Inactive communities 👻 These communities have had no posts in the last month: Imaginary Starships A place to post pictures of imaginary starships, a la r/ImaginaryStarships Imaginary Fairies A community to post artworks of fairies and other fae folk. Imaginary Dragons A community for artwork depicting dragons, wyverns, wyrms, sea serpents, and the like. Imaginary Merfolk A community to share images of mermaids, mermen and other humanoid merfolk. Imaginary Maps - Your source for fictional maps. Maps have been around for centuries- they help us know what cultures were aware of in terms of their neighbors, other lands, and so on. Map making continues today, as we map other planets, the bottom of the seas, and continually produce high quality maps here that measure various aspects of culture, demographics, and geography. Imaginary Characters No description Here is a popular post from one of the inactive communities. 🪦♻️ 🖼️ Fay by SimzArt (direct link), posted in Imaginary Fairies (👍117 👎1) Posted by i_am_not_a_robot The main links are using lemmyverse.link which should redirect to the post on your own instance. If you have not used this before, you may need to go direct to https://lemmyverse.link/ and click on ‘configure instance’. Some apps will open posts correctly when using the direct link. Multicommunity: fnic.json

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Deadly floods hit Ghana after days of torrential rains

::: spoiler [2026-07-01] Russia Today Emergency teams have rescued hundreds of people after heavy rain submerged parts of Accra, the authorities said At least 12 people, including a mother and child, have been confirmed dead in Ghana following floods triggered by heavy rain, the West African nation’s authorities said. The country’s meteorological agency has warned of more rainfall. The floods hit the capital, Accra, and the nearby city of Tema on Monday, submerging roads, homes, and buildings, and cutting off access to several areas, videos shared on social media show. The Ghana National Fire Service (GNFS) said it rescued more than 470 people as of Tuesday. It said the dead included three women, eight men, and one child. A rubber factory in the capital also caught fire amid the deluge. GNFS spokesperson Alex King Nartey told AP that the mother and child were swept away in the Achimota-Agbogbloshie district. He said emergency services struggled to reach some areas and requested military assistance as rescue operations continued. Interior Minister Muntaka Mohammed-Mubarak said 7,761 households have been affected, with at least seven people reported missing. Flooding is a recurring problem in Accra, where choked drains, rapid urban expansion, and construction on waterways have been blamed for worsening the impact of heavy rain. Earlier this month, downpours again flooded parts of the capital on the 11th anniversary of the June 3, 2015 flood and fire disaster that killed more than 150 people near the Kwame Nkrumah Circle in the capital. 🚨 Massive flooding has hit Accra, Ghana 🇬🇭🌊 Heavy rains have left roads submerged, stranded commuters, and caused major disruptions across parts of the capital. pic.twitter.com/SlOwajsuQZ — Paradise News Line (@Paradisenewslin) June 29, 2026 🚒👨🏾‍🚒 YOU CALLED AND WE SWIFTLY RESPONDED WITH COMPASSION ❤️ Thankfully, the raging fire that engulfed a rubber manufacturing factory at Odawna, near Nkrumah Circle in Accra, is being brought under control by our adept firefighters,… pic.twitter.com/iC0EQFMLgt — Ghana National Fire Service (@gnfsofficial) June 30, 2026 Speaking after touring affected areas on Tuesday, Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama said preliminary data showed that around 140 millimeters of rain fell in Accra, the heaviest rainfall recorded in years. Mahama said, “blocked drainage channels and structures obstructing the natural flow of water continue to worsen the impact of heavy rainfall in several parts of the capital.” He ordered the release of 300 million Ghanaian cedis (around $26.5 million) for flood relief and mitigation efforts, and warned against illegal construction on waterways. The Ghana Meteorological Agency issued an alert on Tuesday, warning of a rainstorm approaching southern Ghana, with thunderstorms and rain expected to spread to parts of the middle belt. Neighboring Ivory Coast (Cote d’Ivoire) has also been hit by deadly flooding after days of heavy rain. Ivorian National Cohesion Minister Myss Belmonde Dogo said more than a dozen people died in Abidjan, the country’s economic capital. :::

Komunitas news.abolish.capital

Trump Has Already Launched More Death Penalty Prosecutions Than in His Entire First Term

Less than halfway through Trump’s second term, the U.S. Department of Justice has authorized a rash of new death penalty prosecutions, already surpassing the total number of capital cases brought during Trump’s previous four years in office. Since Trump returned to the White House, DOJ prosecutors have moved to seek the death penalty against at least 42 defendants in 34 cases, according to figures compiled by The Intercept, based on legal records and data from the Justice Department and Federal Capital Trial Project. In at least two additional cases, federal prosecutors have conveyed their plans to seek death but have not yet submitted a notice of intent — the formal legal filing telling the defense and presiding judge that the DOJ seeks to execute a defendant. By comparison, the DOJ authorized some 38 capital defendants total over the course of Trump’s first term. Many of the new cases have originated in places where the death penalty has been abolished — states like New Mexico, Colorado, and Maryland — as well as jurisdictions where there is no history of capital punishment, like the U.S. Virgin Islands. More than 70 percent of the defendants are people of color, most of them Black. The spike in new death penalty cases is a striking illustration of Trump’s longtime enthusiasm for capital punishment, which led him to carry out an unprecedented execution spree in the months before he left office in 2021. It’s also in stark contrast to the Justice Department under President Joe Biden, who put capital prosecutions almost entirely on hold — and whose attorney general, Merrick Garland, deauthorized dozens of pending death penalty cases upon taking office. Trump’s ramped up authorizations won’t necessarily bring a wave of new death sentences. Only a relative handful of federal capital authorizations end up going to trial — and fewer still result in a death sentence. Although executions have been on the rise across the United States since Trump retook office, new death sentences have been on a consistent decline for decades. Prosecutors have become more reluctant to seek death sentences, and jurors have also been less and less willing to send defendants to death row. “The American public has made a very, very decisive turn away from the death penalty during the last 20 years,” said Robin Maher, executive director of the Death Penalty Information Center. “Twenty years ago, we had five times the number of new death sentences than we had last year.” Although Trump’s DOJ “purports to be acting consistent with the will of the American people,” she said, “those are American juries that are making different decisions now.” The Trump administration’s death penalty plans have already come apart in many cases. Since then-Attorney General Pam Bondi first started filing notices of intent last year, roughly a third of the defendants have seen the death penalty taken off the table. In numerous cases, the presiding judge has struck down the government’s authorizations. In one case involving two co-defendants, the DOJ has withdrawn its prior authorization. And two cases have been resolved with guilty pleas. This still leaves at least 27 defendants currently facing capital trials. With Blanche, who was previously Trump’s criminal defense lawyer, vying to become attorney general, there is no reason to expect the push to send people to death row to slow down anytime soon. [ Read our complete coverage Out for Blood -------------](/collections/out-for-blood/) The defendants facing the death penalty under Trump have been accused of grisly crimes, from mass shootings to gang murders. But if there’s one thing driving Trump’s escalating pursuit of new death sentences above all else, it is his sustained rage at Biden, who took the historic step of commuting 37 death sentences before leaving office, leaving three people on federal death row. Trump railed against the commutations in a Truth Social post on Christmas Day, wrongly referring to them as pardons and telling the commuted prisoners themselves to “GO TO HELL!” Upon returning to the White House in January 2025, Trump immediately signaled his intent to repopulate federal death row, proclaiming in an executive order that his administration would “pursue the death penalty for all crimes of a severity demanding its use.” Framed as a rebuke to Biden’s act of clemency, which he derided as a “mockery of justice,” it also called on states to step up their own efforts to execute people — and to try to seek new death sentences at the state level against the 37 men whose federal sentences were commuted. [ Related Pam Bondi Is Pushing Death Sentences for People Spared By Her Predecessor](https://theintercept.com/2026/02/10/trump-death-penalty-execution-pam-bondi/) A month later, in February 2025, newly installed Attorney General Pam Bondi issued a memo to DOJ prosecutors directing them to seek death wherever possible. “Absent significant mitigating circumstances, federal prosecutors are expected to seek the death penalty in cases involving the murder of a law-enforcement officer and capital crimes committed by aliens who are illegally present in the United States,” Bondi wrote. She ordered prosecutors to prioritize capital cases involving gang members and people accused of international drug crimes. And in an unprecedented move, Bondi announced that the DOJ would review every decision in which the Biden administration declined to seek a death sentence to determine whether prosecutors should pursue the death penalty after all. The attempt to turn Biden’s “no-seeks” into capital prosecutions has proven mostly unsuccessful. Of hundreds of cases reviewed by the DOJ, prosecutors ended up filing a notice of intent against 15 defendants who had previously been told they would not face the death penalty. One by one, the new capital authorizations were smacked down by presiding judges, several of whom scolded Trump’s prosecutors for their ham-fisted efforts to win death sentences in cases that, in many instances, were already set for trial. Currently three cases remain in which prosecutors are still seeking to move forward with a capital trial despite the Biden DOJ’s previous decision not to seek death. It did not take long after Bondi was fired for her replacement, acting Attorney General Todd Blanche, to make clear he intended to continue Trump’s death penalty push. In late April, he released a 48-page report by the Office of Legal Policy, which outlined in detail Trump’s plans to ramp up new death sentences and speed up executions. Titled “Restoring and Strengthening the Federal Death Penalty,” the document again framed Trump’s commitment to capital punishment as a response to Biden’s dereliction of duty — and in particular to his betrayal of victims’ families. “It was more like a campaign website instead of a measured legal document by a government agency.” The report included a chart showing Biden’s DOJ’s rejection of capital cases, casting Garland as an outlier among other attorneys general. By contrast, the report devoted little space to Trump’s new authorizations, avoiding entirely its mostly failed attempts to reverse Biden’s “no-seeks.” Nor did it hint at the fact that Blanche, like previous attorneys general, would himself issue a flurry of no-seeks in death-eligible cases upon taking over — something that is standard practice at the DOJ. Death penalty cases are, after all, at least in theory, reserved for only the most serious crimes. “To pursue use of the death penalty in the manner that is set forth in Trump executive order would require an almost singular focus on seeking death sentences to the exclusion of so many other priorities,” Maher said. While the Blanche report is certainly cause for concern, Maher said a lot of it read as a wishlist more than an achievable blueprint. “The majority of that report, I thought, reflected the Trump administration’s grievances about lawful decisions made by the previous administration,” she said. “To me it was more like a campaign website instead of a measured legal document by a government agency.” “These executive orders, these memoranda — everything is changing by the day,” she said. “We just don’t know how this is all going to play out.” What might be most sobering about Trump-era capital punishment is not the way it differs from past presidents but how it remains consistent. In the hands of an administration overtly committed to white supremacy, the defendants chosen by Trump’s DOJ for capital trials look a lot like the defendants who have always faced the federal death penalty. More than 70 percent of Trump’s authorizations have been against people of color, most of them Black. This is strikingly consistent with the federal death penalty’s overall track record; according to the Death Penalty Information Center, 73 percent of capital defendants authorized for death penalty pros­e­cu­tions from 1989 to June 2024 were people of color. The racial disparities in the federal system have been well-documented for decades. Yet, apart from the most high-profile cases, Americans are generally unaware of capital prosecutions brought at the federal level since most authorizations never lead to a death penalty trial — let alone a death sentence. This leaves the most dramatic racial disparities hidden from view. Data from the Federal Capital Trial Project shows that, in the state of Maryland, for example, which has sent only one person to federal death row since the late 1980s, DOJ prosecutors have authorized death penalty prosecutions against more than 30 people, the majority of whom were Black. The rest were Latino. Trump’s recent authorizations replicate this trend, with DOJ prosecutors in Maryland filing notices of intent against four defendants, three of them Latino and one of them Black. (The former three, alleged MS-13 gang members from Baltimore, have since seen their authorizations thrown out by a judge.) Since last year, Trump’s DOJ has also authorized death penalty prosecutions of four people in the Eastern District of Missouri, which is home to St. Louis. As with every other federal authorization from the same jurisdiction to date, all of them are Black. (Two of these defendants have since seen their authorizations withdrawn by the DOJ.) [ Related Amid the Lingering Trauma of Trump’s Executions, a New Project Brings Families to Federal Death Row](https://theintercept.com/2024/02/11/federal-death-row-family-visitation/) Trump’s execution spree six years ago briefly put the racism of the federal death penalty on display. The eighth man put to death, Orlando Hall, had been sentenced to die by an all-white jury in Texas, where, according to his lawyer’s last legal filings, federal prosecutors were “nearly six times more likely to request authorization to seek the death penalty against a Black defendant than a non-Black defendant.” Co-defendants Christopher Vialva and Brandon Bernard, who were executed less than three months apart, were sent to death row by a federal prosecutor who openly told me that people considered him “crazy” for allowing a single Black man to serve on their jury. At that time, the U.S. was experiencing a supposed reckoning over race, which made such cases all the more disturbing to those paying attention. Yet the executions had been made possible by a Democratic party that paved the way for Trump’s killing spree by expanding the death penalty in a way that was racially skewed from the start. That Trump’s aggressive death penalty push is no more racist than what came before speaks volumes about what capital punishment has always been. The post Trump Has Already Launched More Death Penalty Prosecutions Than in His Entire First Term appeared first on The Intercept. From The Intercept via This RSS Feed.

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How to manipulate individual vertices?

Newbie here. FreeCAD is v1.1.1 Is there really no way to do simple manual vertices manipulation? Coming from Wings3D. Found the Fase feature (PartDesign_Chamfer) which is a good start for my usual extrude/bevel workflow but I can not for my life find out how to manually select and move vertexes manually / individually. I learned about converting a part into a mesh but even here I seem to not have the option to move vertices around freely? Do I really have to go down to a 2D drawing first and work from there?

Komunitas lemmy.ml

Burnham’s New Economics Advisor Oversaw Illegal Sacking of Staff Member

Andy Burnham’s new economics advisor oversaw an illegal sacking and an incident where police were called on his own staff, according to a trade union. The Independent Workers’ of Great Britain (IWGB) union said Andy Haldane should not be “anywhere near a government that claims to stand for working people”. Last week it was reported that Burnham was receiving advice from some “top economists” ahead of his Labour leadership run, including Haldane, a former Bank of England chief economist. Haldane was the chief executive of the Royal Society of Arts (RSA) from 2021 to 2025, where he oversaw a period of unrest, with staff taking strike action for the first time in the charity’s 270-year history after management refused to recognise their trade union. Burnham’s appointment of new economic advisors is seen as an attempt to bolster his fiscal credibility. However, Haldane’s former staff have expressed concerns that his inclusion “points in the opposite direction” of a leadership that can “bring people together”.

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400-year-old painting reveals a bat's secret diet

Natural historians have many observational techniques in their toolkit for learning about the natural world: tagging animals with tracking devices, recording sounds, analyzing droppings or simply watching and counting. As technology has advanced, these methods have grown far more precise and wide-reaching, letting researchers capture details that were once impossible to detect. Even today, however, these cutting-edge tools aren’t the only route to discovery. From Biology News - Evolution, Cell theory, Gene theory, Microbiology, Biotechnology via This RSS Feed.

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Monitoring

Bouta turn out delicious and… full of grease? Probably theres a better way to extend the metaphor…

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Hewaoijsdb

Lihat kiriman asli pada platform media sosial terkait.

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Lemmy Shitshow

Why aren’t you posting recipes for quiche? I don’t care that I wandered into a shitposting thread about a powertrippingbastards threads about a shower thoughts thread. I want this thread to be about quiche. So why aren’t you posting about quiche?

Komunitas midwest.social

specialwall

You may be able to find me on other platforms by the same name! Mastodon: [email protected] Contact me on SimpleX or Signal!

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War. What Is It Still Good For?

Really hate international relations, but it is satisfying seeing their lizard brains be forced to reckon with the real world. People really misuse the fucking Clausewitz quote I hear it at least three times a day when logged on. No, I don’t just read things with Atlantic Council & Heritage Foundation citations to get mad, but it is good for that. ::: spoiler [2026-07-01] Russia in Global Affairs For citation, please use: Kavanagh, J., 2026. War. What Is It Still Good For? Russia in Global Affairs, 24(3), pp. 28–49. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-3-28-49 Writing in the early 19th century, Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz argued that states go to war with one goal in mind: “to compel our enemy to do our will” (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 75). Alfred Thayer Mahan later described the intent of naval warfare similarly. Its objective, he declared, should be to “drive the enemy’s flag from the seas” (Mahan, 1890, p. 138). In recent years, these types of unambiguous victories and far-reaching conquests have been elusive. When Israel started its war in Gaza after October 2023, for instance, the country’s leaders promised to eradicate Hamas and demilitarize the territory (Netanyahu, 2023). Today, more than two years later, Hamas remains armed and in control of parts of Gaza. Similarly, though the U.S. military campaign in Iran in 2026 was intended to impose regime change in Tehran, Operation Epic Fury accomplished little (Trump, 2026b). When Washington accepted a ceasefire, it was Iran that emerged with its negotiating position improved even if it did suffer significant military setbacks. These and other similar recent military failures raise a simple but troubling question: Has warfare lost its practical value for states seeking to achieve political objectives? Clearly, military power retains its ability to inflict costs and cause destruction. But can it still be used to accomplish political change or to decisively defeat a troublesome adversary? At the very least, what can be attained using force today appears to be narrower than was true in the past. There are several reasons for new constraints on the utility of military power, but among the most important are changes in technology that have favored weaker actors using asymmetric strategies and the rising economic and industrial challenges of fighting large and lengthy military campaigns even for wealthy states. These new limits may be temporary, or they may be enduring, but either way they have significant implications for political leaders thinking about using military force to achieve priority objectives today and for the foreseeable future. However, it is far too soon to declare warfare a futile endeavor for states seeking to advance political goals. Despite new challenges, there are at least three ways that states can still productively use war to advance political aims. First, recent experience suggests that military force remains useful for the achievement of very narrow objectives, including limited land grabs accomplished through short duration military operations and elimination of high value targets. Second, states can continue to use warfare as a preventative tool, stopping or averting undesired outcomes even if they cannot as easily impose far reaching positive change. Finally, states can use military campaigns for extraction, that is, to take control of valuable natural, manufacturing, and geostrategic resources. With defense budgets rising as countries across the globe increase the size of their armed forces and adopt more militarized foreign policies, the frequency of war is likely to continue to increase despite its new limitations. To avoid falling into costly military quagmires, future political and military leaders will need to have a clear-eyed and realistic understanding of the new boundaries on warfare’s potential and a firm grasp on when war can advance their aims and when it will backfire. Why War’s Utility Has Declined To understand how the utility of warfare is changing, it is necessary to first consider why. The most obvious driver of change is technology. By disproportionately benefiting weaker powers and in many cases amplifying the benefits of being on the defense, recent technological developments have made it considerably more difficult for even the most powerful militaries to achieve decisive and quick victories. The advent and rapid evolution of cheap drones and loitering munitions, for instance, has dramatically changed the character of warfare across domains. On the ground, it is now treacherous for armies to seize and hold new territory, as the maneuver warfare of previous eras is nearly impossible when large numbers of drones can saturate the battlespace. Instead of being a sign of military strength and prowess as in the past, concentrations of tanks, heavy weapons, and personnel are now a vulnerability (Baluyevsky and Pukhov, 2026; Admiral and Drake, 2025). Territorial gains occur instead with the use of small groups of soldiers taking advantage of gaps in adversary lines to rapidly stake out new positions that they hope to build from over time (Kofman, 2026). Drones have also complicated sea and air warfare, posing new threats to advanced aircraft and warships and making complete air and sea control elusive (Pettyjohn and Scharre, 2025; Davis, 2025). Even states with modest military resources can use these new technologies as part of low-cost, asymmetric strategies to fight much stronger adversaries to stalemate, although such tactics bear high casualty rates and may require external assistance. Drones have defined recent military campaigns, including that in Ukraine, the U.S. war in Iran, and operations by Houthi forces to blockade the Bab el-Mandeb, and help explain why these conflicts slipped into costly stalemates. In the Middle East, Iran used drones to weaken U.S. air defense networks and damage early warning aircraft while also employing the threat of drone and missile fire to effectively close the Strait of Hormuz (Kavanagh, 2026). In Ukraine, drones have dominated the battlefield, forcing both sides to adopt new tactics and at times freezing the frontline, despite Russia’s significant military advantages (Watling and Reynolds, 2023). In each of these cases, the low barriers to procuring and producing large numbers of drones have contributed to surprising outcomes. Drones have, for example, allowed Ukraine to stay in the fight longer than expected and contributed to the U.S. decision to accept a ceasefire with Iran in April 2026. Beyond drones, the proliferation of cheap and precise mass-produced weapons has leveled the battlefield in other ways as well. For example, the rapid spread of simple and cheap but effective missile technologies has enabled weak state and non-state actors to inflict damage on more powerful adversaries in new ways. In the case of Houthi forces in Yemen, for instance, the group’s arsenal of cheap missiles and mobile missile launchers allowed it to survive intense U.S. bombing (even after years of Saudi efforts to root out the group using military force) while still keeping the Bab el-Mandeb closed to commercial traffic (Eavis, 2023). Similarly, despite assertions from the Pentagon, Tehran was able to sustain its ability to produce cheap missiles and to strike Israel, U.S., and Gulf state targets—including sensitive and strategically valuable ones like U.S. bases and early warning radars—even after over a month of punishing airstrikes (DeBree and Toropin, 2026). This complicated and thwarted the plans of U.S. military commanders who were not used to operating in such contested environments. The diffusion of military power has, in other words, eroded U.S. dominance in ways not seen in over 80 years. For other advanced militaries the effect is largely the same, if somewhat less pronounced. A final notable technological development that complicates the effective use of military power is the growing transparency of war across air, sea, and ground domains. Until recently, the ability to see the battlefield in its entirety was a privilege of more powerful militaries. However, systems like Starlink, technologies like drones, and the widespread availability of high quality opensource intelligence have allowed even weak actors to increase their command and control, battlespace awareness, and defense and targeting capabilities. Ukraine has relied heavily on Starlink, for identifying targets and supporting air defense operations, while using drones to prevent surprise attacks (Radin et al, 2025). Iran has turned to open-source intelligence and commercial satellite data to inform its military operations and targeting of U.S. bases (Johnson, 2026). This new transparency has made surprise attacks and offensive operations more difficult, favoring long wars of attrition with inconclusive outcomes over convincing and clear military victories. Of course, just as technological change has recently empowered smaller militaries and states operating on the defensive, future developments could swing the pendulum back in the opposite direction. For instance, today, the speed of drone production is far ahead and the cost far below that for counter-drone systems. When this changes or reverses, the role of drones in warfare may be largely neutralized or at least lessened. Maneuver warfare might then make a return. Similarly, over time, major powers with the money to exploit new emerging technologies may find ways to reclaim their military edge. Already major powers are working to develop new exquisite systems, long-range missiles, advanced aircraft, and undersea capabilities that will allow them to overcome or avoid the threat of drones and breakthrough attritional stalemates in the future. But even as it continues to evolve, warfare seems unlikely to revert entirely to what it was in earlier eras. Some degree of change is likely to be permanent. In addition to technological changes, new economic and industrial challenges also constrain what can be achieved with military force today. Specifically, the rising economic and industrial cost of war and the growing reliance of states at all levels of military development on scarce and sometimes expensive input parts—semiconductors, critical minerals, and others—make long military campaigns more difficult and less sustainable, at least at high levels of intensity and for extended periods of time. Modern weapons are more lethal than those of previous eras—more effective, precise, and powerful—but they are also more expensive, especially when considering the most advanced and exquisite ones. During the war in Iran, for instance, the U.S. burned through as much as $1 billion per day for a total of $40 billion over the first 40 days of war (Cancian and Park, 2026; Robertson and Beggin, 2026). Much of this cost was expended munitions, which easily cost between $1 and $12 million each (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025). The capabilities required in Ukraine have been less expensive, but not necessarily cheaper in the aggregate, when bought in large quantities. In total, Ukraine has received hundreds of billions of dollars in military aid from the U.S. and the EU over its first four years of war (Trebesch and Nishikawa, 2025). The high economic costs of war create limits on how long any state can continue a large-scale military operation and on what can be achieved. At some point, even wealthy states face constraints on how many resources they can devote to war, especially as the returns to marginal spending fall. This may not force ceasefire, but it can limit the ability to escalate or expand the war in ways that might increase the chances of success. This is especially significant alongside changes in technology that give weak adversaries greater endurance and contribute to longer wars of attrition. In Israel, for instance, several years of war have caused economic challenges for the small nation, with the government periodically moving towards de-escalation simply to let reservists return to their civilian jobs (Wrobel, 2026). In the U.S., the costs of both support to Ukraine and fighting in Iran have been widely unpopular, and concerns about the effect of war in the Middle East on the U.S. economy drove President Donald Trump to take an off-ramp before any of his more ambitious political aims were achieved, effectively forcing restraint on the U.S… Both Russia and Ukraine may ultimately also be forced to change their military strategies due to economic constraints, even if that point is some ways off for both. States that cannot achieve their aims quickly, in other words, may find that they face a choice between military compromise and economic ruin, even when battling a weak adversary. The industrial demands of war pose their own limits on the use of military force. War today is as much a test of industrial capacity as it is of battlefield skill (Vershinin, 2022). This has always been true to an extent, but shifting global economic trends and deindustrialization in some parts of the world have created structural barriers to achieving the necessary levels of production that did not exist in the past (National Association of Manufacturers, 2026). Smaller qualified workforce (a problem globally) only makes this challenge harder to solve in the near term (Deloitte & The Manufacturing Institute, 2024). When the U.S. started arming Ukraine, it found that it could not surge defense production like it hoped. The problem was amplified with the start of the war in Iran, and despite extensive political and economic investment no solution has emerged. Although munitions shortages are not a reason the U.S. accepted a ceasefire, concern about the effect of dwindling stockpiles on global deterrence may have been the reason for Trump’s avoiding a full-scale conflict. Current estimates suggest it will take years to replace what has been expended, constraining U.S. military ambitions in the near and medium term (Cancian, 2026). Israel’s military achievements are also limited by defense materiel, particularly its access to air defense. The EU faces similar problems as it tries to rearm quickly while also supplying weapons to Ukraine. Finally, in addition to production capacity, there is also the pressure created by scarcity of key inputs. As the U.S. considers the best way to ramp up its production of missiles and other key weapons, it faces possible shortages of critical minerals that may place a cap on how quickly it can replenish stockpiles. This may force it to scale back future military campaigns (Payne Institute for Public Policy, 2026; Dayen, 2026). For other countries, especially those under U.S. sanctions, it is access to key technologies like advanced semiconductors that create the most severe constraint on defense production and, therefore, on military ambitions (Boulègue, 2025). Together, the effect of these input shortages is like that of war’s high costs—it makes it much harder for even wealthy states to sustain large-scale military campaigns indefinitely (although they may still try for ideological reasons). Economic and industrial constraints on warfare are likely to create hard limits on what states can achieve using military force and are likely to remain in place for some time. States across regions are looking to ramp up defense industrial production to overcome these limits but their progress has been mixed, casting doubts on whether they will be successful in the end. As noted above, global shortages of necessary labor, critical minerals, and other inputs may not be surmountable. For some states, including the U.S., high debt to GDP ratios make traditional ways of funding war increasingly risky. And in many places growing public discontent with the social sacrifices required to fund future wars will hamper reindustrialization. The U.S. hopes that massive investments in its defense industrial base will remove economic constraints on warfare but after at least a decade of trying, its effectiveness has been limited (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, 2026; Clark, 2024). Europe is making a similar push, but its halting progress and lack of true political will give us reason to be skeptical (Mejino-Lopez and Wolff, 2024). We should, of course, be careful not to overindex on the experience in Ukraine or Iran or other recent wars. Recent technological and economic trends observed in these conflicts may not create perpetual binding constraints on what can be reasonably accomplished using military power. Warfare will continue to evolve, and states will adapt over time. But, in the near term, states will be left to grapple with the barriers created by new technology and economic dynamics. And even if the character of future war will not be static, it is also unlikely to revert entirely to what it was in the past. When War Still Works Even with constraints, however, war as a lever of state power can accomplish goals that other means cannot. For this reason, military force will continue to be appealing despite its downsides. First, military force is still a powerful tool for achieving limited and narrowly defined objectives, including elimination of high value targets and quick annexation of small pieces of territory. Such military moves can also rapidly shift bargaining dynamics in ongoing diplomatic negotiations and so may have utility beyond their near-term tangible gains. There are several recent examples worth considering. The U.S. under President Trump has been a frequent employer of military force towards such limited aims, including in Latin America and the Middle East. The U.S. kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and the U.S.-Israeli assassination of multiple layers of Iranian officials including the Supreme Leader are two examples of successful leadership decapitation (Taub, 2026). Although we could question the practical political effects of such operations, in both cases the U.S. military was able to effectively eliminate targets deemed threats to the U.S. or its allies. In Venezuela, this was enough to force Maduro’s associates to bend to U.S. demands. The U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear program in June 2025 is another instance in which a limited application of military force successfully removed a perceived threat to the U.S., in this case setting back Iran’s nuclear program, at least temporarily. Trump hoped the narrow win would earn him Iranian concessions in negotiations, but this has so far failed. Other states have also been able to use military force to achieve narrow aims, including annexation of contested territory. Importantly, in some cases, states have been successful in achieving narrow goals not despite but because of new technological advances, such as drones, electronic warfare, and other hybrid capabilities. In other words, the same technologies that make it difficult for states to achieve expansive political goals may facilitate their achievement of more limited aims if used intentionally to create and exploit time limited military advantages, especially those that can be used as leverage at the bargaining table. Azerbaijan’s successful military campaigns in 2020 and 2023, for instance, allowed the country to forcibly seize contested territory lost in previous conflicts, but these operations were successful because Baku kept its objectives narrow. In 2020, during what became known as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan combined its conventional air superiority with advanced drone capabilities to destroy Armenian air defenses and maneuver units, clearing the way for its own forces to seize much disputed territory and the leverage to the rest at the negotiating table (Shaikh, Shaan, and Wes Rumbaugh, 2020). Notably, Azerbaijan’s tactics and success foreshadowed the type of combat that would come to characterize the military conflict in Ukraine several years later—small groups of fighters penetrating adversary defenses, supported by short- and mid-range drones that partially replaced traditional artillery and heavy weapons. Rather than relying only or primarily on heavy forces to reclaim land, Azerbaijan’s offensive made use of highly trained special forces personnel who were able to infiltrate Armenia’s defenses more easily and more cheaply, and without exposing its own maneuver forces (Postma, 2021). Azerbaijan kept its campaign focused and limited, concentrated on a narrow slice of territory. It also emphasized speed, with a short duration that allowed it to conclude the conflict before Armenian forces had time to adapt, reconstitute, or develop drone or counter-drone capabilities of its own. Even when Armenia’s military effectively collapsed, Baku did not expand the scope of its objectives right away. Instead, it waited until 2023, when it reclaimed the remaining contested territory in a quick additional offensive, made easier and attainable using the consolidated positions that it built during the 2020 campaign (Landgraf and Seferian, 2024). An interesting counterfactual is what might have happened if Azerbaijan’s military had not stopped where it did in 2020 but expanded its ambitions trying to push farther into Armenian territory. Of course, it is impossible to know for sure, but other recent conflicts would warn of the risk of diminishing returns and the likelihood that Armenia’s military would eventually catch up technologically over time (likely with external assistance) slowing or halting Azerbaijan’s progress over time. Lest this seem unlikely given Azerbaijan’s rapid success it is worth considering the experience of Israel in Lebanon in 2024 and 2026. After dealing Hezbollah significant military setbacks in 2024 including significantly expanding its territorial buffer zone in southern Lebanon, Israel resumed its military campaign in 2026 alongside the U.S.-Israeli war in Iran seeking to expand its territorial control. However, its ground operations were less successful and more treacherous this time, in part because Hezbollah’s remaining cadre of fighters had gained new military capabilities including fiber optic drones that they used to impose substantial costs and disrupt the progress of Israeli military forces (The Guardian, 2026). As in other cases discussed here, as Israel’s goals became more expansive and its ambitions greedier, its military watched its advantages disappear. Russia’s successful ‘reincorporation’ of Crimea is a final important example of a limited scope military campaign that was effective because it maintained narrow aims. In Crimea, Russian operations focused on a defined piece of territory and used hybrid tactics to quickly seize control of Crimea’s government buildings and communication hubs (Kofman et al., 2017). It thus preempted any sort of asymmetric military response and skirted the economic and industrial costs of modern warfare by accomplishing its objectives quickly (this is one of the appeals of such hybrid tactics, evidenced today across Europe and Asia). In a matter of weeks, in fact, Russian authorities had de facto control of the territory. Contrast this with the current military campaign in Ukraine which initially had more expansive political goals but could not overcome the technological and economic requirements of achieving them. Now, that war has settled into stalemate and what Moscow is likely to achieve is far less than initially intended. The second achievable goal for states looking to use military force to advance political objectives is prevention. While even powerful militaries increasingly struggle to impose positive political change, war can still be used to prevent undesired outcomes temporarily or permanently. The logic of preventative war is, of course, not new. States fearing that a rival may soon become too strong to challenge have often leaned on military action, not to preempt an imminent threat, but to stop one from emerging in the first place. This is what American political scientist Graham Allison has called the Thucydides Trap, a concept he applies with concern to the U.S.-China relationship (Allison, 2017). Sparta’s attack on Athens in the Peloponnesian War (even if by some accounts Athens goaded its adversary into battle) is the classic example of such a war, launched by Sparta fearful that the Athenian empire would soon be so militarily powerful as to be untouchable (Thucydides, 1972). Even with new economic challenges and technology-driven democratization of military power, war continues to serve a preventative function and is likely to continue to do so. This should not be surprising, as the bar to destroy is much lower than that to create. Even if there are barriers to decisive defeats, advanced militaries can typically leverage greater firepower, advanced aircraft, and deeper stockpiles to degrade weaker adversaries enough to avert outcomes that they cannot tolerate. For the U.S., Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025 was a preventative campaign aimed at debilitating Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities and setting back its progress towards a nuclear weapon (Trump, 2025). It was successful in this aim. Operation Epic Fury, in contrast, aimed not just to destroy but also to alter the fundamental political reality in Iran (Golden, 2026). Expectations for a quick U.S. victory underestimated the ways in which technology and economics now complicate efforts to impose political transformation through military force. After Iran’s surprisingly effective defensive attacks on U.S. military infrastructure and recognizing the high costs of an extended war, Washington gave up its attempt to enact political change and reverted to preventative goals, including weakening Iran’s conventional military capabilities and thwarting its ability to project military power outside its borders (The White House, 2026). To the extent that there was a threat to begin with (this is debatable), Washington has had better luck with these preventative aims. A better example of a military campaign that achieved preventative success while falling short of more expansive outcomes is the conflict in Ukraine. While Russia’s special military operation is deemed a failure by many in Europe, this is only true if success is defined as total control of Ukraine. As a means of prevention, the military campaign in Ukraine has had more positive results. Most importantly, the ongoing conflict has likely already ruled out certain futures for Ukraine. Not only did it avert results that would have crossed Moscow’s long-time redlines, such as Ukraine’s membership in NATO (which was unlikely but is now off the table) and the future presence of U.S. or European military force inside Ukraine (which was assured and now seems unlikely, at least in large numbers), but it also built a territorial buffer that offers some protection no matter what the shape of Ukraine’s future military capabilities might be (Sutherland, 2025), though of course the security provided by territorial buffers can be undermined by long-range drones and missiles. It is possible that a smaller, more limited military operation could have achieved these preventative aims at a much lower cost to Russia’s economy and society. But it is not clear that war could be avoided entirely, given the U.S. and Europe’s refusal to discuss NATO’s encroachment through diplomatic channels. Preventative war in this case accomplished what negotiations could not. The August 2008 Russo-Georgian War offers another example of preventive success, despite being criticized for tactical and operational shortcomings and despite an ambiguous, inconclusive outcome. As in Ukraine, Moscow’s primary accomplishment in this conflict was halting the institutionalization of Georgia’s Western alignment, including progress towards NATO or EU accession (Coffey and Mrachek, 2020). For this outcome, far-reaching territorial gains or political change in Tbilisi were unnecessary. All that was required to achieve Russia’s preventative aim was partial success, something attainable despite technological constraints on Russia’s military operation. Once Russian forces penetrated deep into Georgia proper, they were able to provide military cover for South Ossetia and Abkhazia to break away from Georgian control, without formal territorial claims. (Cohen and Hamilton, 2011; Vendil Pallin and Westerlund, 2009). The existence of unsettled territorial disputes served as a sufficient obstacle to Georgia’s accession in either case. In addition, the final settlement accepted permanent Russian presence and influence in South Ossetia and Abkahzia, thus offering additional insurance against the expansion of an American or European military footprint farther eastward (Chincharadze and Goodson, 2024; Nichol, 2008). The final accessible goal for states looking to exploit military power is access to scarce resources. Resource extraction has always been a driver of war and today is no different. But there are two novel dimensions: the types of resources pursued and the geopolitical significance of those resources. First, states are no longer only after physical resources such as gold or oil but also access to technology and its inputs (such as rare earths) and to manufacturing capacity. As the costs of using military power and its technological requirements rise, the appeal of using military force to seize key inputs also increases. Second, today states are interested in claiming anything that can serve as a chokepoint that offers leverage or advantages over a rival. This could include territory, scarce resources, technology, waterways, or airspace—a list that implies the potential for many new military flashpoints. Unlike past U.S. presidents, Trump has been quite explicit about resource extraction as an aim of war. After the attack on Venezuela, for instance, Trump could not stop talking about the country’s oil wealth and wasted no time extracting it or, according to some of his cabinet officials, other resources such as gold (Trump, 2026a). His goal was not only monetary reward but U.S. control of scarce energy resources in high demand by other (rival) states. He has discussed taking Iran’s oil almost as frequently (Xinhua, 2026). And if he ends up using military force to seize or expand U.S. access in Greenland, the country’s resources will be a major motivator, including its critical minerals and position along key trade routes, sea lines of communication, and maritime chokepoints (NPR, 2026). The focus on resource extraction is not surprising from a transactional president motivated by wealth. But other states have also been able to use warfare for resource extraction, to augment their income or advance their strategic position. Though Russia’s main motivation for its military operation in Ukraine may not have been resources, Russia has captured key critical mineral mines, including lithium, graphite, and coal. These resources are lucrative in themselves but also important are certain types of high-tech manufacturing that can benefit Russia’s economy or be leverage for future business deals (Kozlowska and O’Grady, 2022). Russia could profit from the strong manufacturing potential of the territories it now occupies, after the war. In fact, while there are many reasons why Russia has made control of the rest of Donetsk a condition for ending the war, the additional natural and economic resources in this region are not irrelevant. ‘Reincorporation’ of Crimea similarly offered extractive benefits, including prime access to important sea routes, oil and gas reserves, and critical minerals (Bugriy, 2014). There are other resource driven wars ongoing in the Middle East and Africa. Israel has been unapologetic in its exploitation of resources seized over the course of its many wars. It has taken control of gas reserves in Lebanon and Gaza, exploited rich farmland in the West Bank, and taken water and energy resources from Syria and elsewhere (Gomez, 2026; Ahmed, 2024; UN News, 2026). Further afield, the UAE has used its role in the war in Sudan to seize much of the country’s gold and to exploit its farmland. Meanwhile, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have used the ongoing conflict in Yemen to take control of much of the country’s energy resources and oil profits (Ardemagni, 2026; Al-Khatib, 2021). It is hard to find a war that does not involve resource extraction at least at some level, and this is unlikely to change. Scarcity may increase the frequency with which seizing resources becomes an important wartime aim. In some cases, the territory that must be seized to claim resources is too vast and in other cases, too difficult to control for successful extraction and exploitation of resources. But, when this is possible, it serves as a consolation prize for states that try and fail to achieve broader political goals. Warnings for the Future Even as its utility narrows, war can still accomplish goals that are out of reach using other levers of statecraft. As a result, political leaders of all kinds will continue to view miliary power as essential, and use of military force as a sometimes necessary and strategically valuable option—and they will be right. The fact that what can be achieved using military means is now more limited is significant, however. Political leaders that fail to understand how the utility of military force has changed over time are likely to end up in high cost and low return wars that leave them weaker over the long-term. On the other hand, those who understand the specific value of military power and both the benefits and risks of new technologies in today’s world will have many advantages. They will be able to use targeted military operations to accomplish narrow territorial goals, prevent outcomes that cross their red lines in a cost-effective way, improve their leverage in economic or political negotiations, and augment their wealth and in some cases geostrategic advantages. Importantly, a world in which the utility of military power is limited will not be a more peaceful world, but a more cutthroat and violent one. Able to achieve mostly predatory and destructive aims, when wars do occur, they are likely to be more brutal, more disruptive, and more punitive for their victims—without much hope of a better post-war reality. These lessons are important for all states, but they are especially relevant for today’s major powers—China, Russia, and the U.S. With far more military capacity than their neighbors, these states are perhaps most likely to turn quickly to the use of force to achieve their aims and most likely to be too ambitious about the goals they set, overestimating the reach of their military power and underestimating its constraints. As military power diffuses more widely and the costs of modern war rise, the consequences of such mistakes will multiply. For the U.S., this is a perennial problem, exemplified by the fact that Washington has attacked seven states in the past year alone and slipped into an unnecessary military conflict in Iran that most deem a strategic failure. In the past, the U.S. had enough military power to survive such errors. But the consequences of U.S. mistakes are rapidly rising as the challenges of warfare become more pernicious and the world becomes more multipolar. The recent experiences of the U.S. and of Russia offer a warning for China (the only major power not involved in a major war) as it considers the potential for a high-risk war over the fate of Taiwan. Although China seeks peaceful reunification with Taiwan, it has not ruled out the use of force (Taiwan Affairs Office, 2022). China can, almost certainly, use overwhelming military power to prevent Taiwan’s independence, using devastating airstrikes to incapacitate the island. It can likely seize Taiwan’s outlying islands without too much trouble. It could also blockade Taiwan and cut it off from vital resources to force political capitulation. But even China may face limits on what it can achieve using military power alone. If it cannot win quickly through an offensive campaign, it too might find itself trapped in a military quagmire. Successful reunification will require a political settlement at some point, in other words. Beijing seems to intuit this, which is why it has continued to push for political accommodation rather than war (Channel News Asia, 2026). If this continues, a war over the island may be less likely than many predict. The growing constraints on what war can achieve also offer two important lessons for states that are currently militarizing, like most of Europe and Asia, in preparation for future conflict. First, states in Europe and Asia focused on rearming should understand the boundaries of what they can achieve using military power and its risks. While military power is necessary, it alone is not enough to guarantee their security. In a world in which military force is most useful in limited land and resource grabs, targeted strikes, and preventative wars, massive military buildups can be a double-edged sword—increasing the risk of conflict with adversaries who perceive a growing threat or who see dialogue as useless, rather than offering protection. For Europe, the best bulwark against future aggression may not be unconstrained military buildup but rather a degree of political accommodation and a security architecture that includes Russia and ultimately makes preventative wars and buffer zones unnecessary. The same is likely true in Asia. Second, for now, states in Europe and Asia, including those on NATO’s front line or close to China, should have more confidence in their security. The conflicts in Ukraine and Iran have shown the equalizing effect of new technologies on today’s warfare and what can be achieved using asymmetric capabilities. They thus have every reason to be optimistic about their ability to protect themselves and to deter and avoid conflict with their much larger neighbors. This will require intentional policy choices, however, and an end to narratives about the inevitability of perpetual war. Despite these warnings, as states continue to invest in their military capabilities, the appeal of war may rise. States that keep their use of force limited and focused, aimed at prevention and leverage, may end up significantly better off. But states that fail to understand how warfare has changed and continue to seek decisive outcomes and far-reaching political ambitions using military power are likely to find themselves worse off: entangled, depleted, and facing no good options. :::

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swan_pr

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How to tell if Adderall is working?

I’ve found that if I don’t make an effort to focus, I won’t - drugs or not. I’ll just go down a random rabbit hole if I’m not careful. “What do I want to work on for the next hour” those ridiculous coping mechanisms people offer for time management - give them a shot again. They might actually work with the drugs. That’s been my experience at least.

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This Apple Lie at the grocery store

Do you drink water? What about coffee or tea? All of those are highly processed (or at least they should be to be safe). Science by its nature is designed to discover new ideas, new knowledge, and new information. When those discoveries happen, the understanding of humanity on a topic changes and improves. It’s why we don’t dump feces into our drinking water and why our drinking water is highly processed, all thanks to John Snow’s (not the character) scientific discovery. So yes, the recommendations of food science changes because it should. But the basics have been known for a while (protein, carbs, fiber, fats, moderation, etc). The details are still being worked out, but fundamentals are known.

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